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As  of  2015  a major  reform  in  LTC  is  taking  place  in the Netherlands.  An  important  objec-
tive  of the  reform  is  to reign  in expenditure  growth  to  safeguard  the  ﬁscal  sustainability  of
LTC. Other  objectives  are  to improve  the  quality  of  LTC  by  making  it more  client-tailored.
The  reform  consists  of four  interrelated  pillars:  a normative  reorientation,  a shift  from  res-
idential  to non-residential  care,  decentralization  of  non-residential  care  and  expenditure
cuts. The  article  gives  a  brief  overview  of these  pillars  and their  underlying  assumptions.
Furthermore,  attention  is  paid  to  the  political  decision-making  process  and  the  politics  of
implementation  and evaluation.  Perceptions  of  the  effects  of  the reform  so  far widely  dif-
fer: positive  views  alternate  with  critical  views.  Though  the  reform  is  radical  in  various
aspects,  LTC  care  will  remain  a largely  publicly  funded  provision.  A statutory  health  insur-
ance scheme  will  remain  in  place  to cover  residential  care.  The  role  of  municipalities  in
publicly  funded  non-residential  care  is  signiﬁcantly  upgraded.  The  ﬁnal  section  contains  a
few policy  lessons.
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. Introduction
The Dutch system of LTC features a central role of the
tate in the regulation of LTC, a high level of public spend-
ng, services instead of cash transfers as major instrument,
 generous service package for clients, and an emphasis on
esidential care [1–5]. The Netherlands is the second high-
st spender on LTC after Sweden in the OECD-countries
6].
After almost two decades of political discussion and
eports (e.g., [7,8]) urging for a reform of LTC to safeguard
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its ﬁscal sustainability, the government managed to build
a political majority for an overhaul of LTC. The reform has
come into effect as of 2015. This article offers a brief anal-
ysis of the reform from a policy perspective (objectives,
instruments and assumptions) and politics perspective
(stakeholders, interests and bargaining).
2. The structure and ﬁnancing of LTC in the
pre-reform era
LTC in the Netherlands [9] includes a broad range
of health and social-care services for various categories
of clients including persons with cognitive, physical
or sensory handicaps, persons with long-term mental
health problems and older persons with somatic and/or
psychogeriatric problems. In January 2014, nearly 5% of
the population received LTC with a 45–55 split between
residential care and non-residential care [26]. The biggest
category (56%) consisted of older persons. In total, 16%
is is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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of the population aged 65 and older received either
residential or non-residential LTC.
LTC is largely publicly funded. In 2012, private ﬁnancing
(mainly income-related copayments) accounted for only
8% of total expenditures (Taskforce, 2012). Public ﬁnancing
is combined with private delivery by mainly not-for-proﬁt
provider organizations. A marginal stand-alone private sec-
tor for the wealthy co-exists with the public LTC scheme.
Until 2015, LTC was ﬁnanced by two  schemes:
the Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (Algemene Wet
Bijzondere Ziektekosten: AWBZ),  covering 95% of pub-
lic expenditures for LTC, and the Social Support Act
(Wet  Maatschappelijke Ondersteuning: WMO), covering the
remaining 5% (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2015). The AWBZ,
in place since 1968, was a statutory health insurance
scheme, mainly funded by income-related contributions.
It paid for a broad range of services in residential and
non-residential care [10]. Implementation was delegated
to regional care ofﬁces run by a single health insurer (usu-
ally the regional market leader) as the representative of all
insurers in the region.
The AWBZ also gave clients the option of a cash transfer
or personal budget (persoonsgebonden budget: PGB) to self-
purchase health services and assistance including informal
care. The PGB has been a ‘growth industry’: in 2005–2008
the number of budget holders grew by an average of 28%
a year [11]. People with handicaps or mental health prob-
lems constitute around two-thirds of the budget holders.
In 2014, the average budget was about 22.000 euros and
around 9% of all LTC expenditure was funded through a per-
sonal budget [12]. Measures to dampen the inﬂux of clients
were only partially successful.
The WMO,  in place since 2007, is a tax-funded scheme
run by municipalities covering various assistance programs
including housekeeping services, transport services, meal
services, house adjustments and social shelter for homeless
people and drug addicts. Municipalities possess substantial
policy discretion in the implementation of the WMO  and
the local co-payment regime. However, means-testing is
forbidden.
From 2000–2012, total expenses of LTC for older
persons and persons with a handicap rose by 115%
(http://statline.cbs.nl). The expenses of the PGB scheme
even quintupled (Zorginstituut Nederland, 2015). In 2010,
the Netherlands spent 4.3% of its Gross Domestic Product
on LTC [13].
3. The reform of long-term care
The ﬁrst step in the reform of LTC took place in 2007
with the introduction of the WMO.  The major reason for
this reform was to call for greater individual responsibility
in LTC. The reform also upgraded the role of municipalities
in non-residential care. The most conspicuous alteration
was that the coverage of housekeeping services was  shifted
from the AWBZ to the new WMO.  The budget for these
services was also substantially cut. It was eventually the
ﬁnancial crisis of 2008 opening a window of opportunity
for a more radical reform [14]. An important objective of
the current reform is to reign in expenditure growth. In the
government’s view, the projected growth of LTC expenses Policy 120 (2016) 241–245
from 4.3% of the GDP in 2010 to 7% or even 9% in 2040,
depending on the assumptions made [13], would not be
sustainable. Other stated objectives are to improve the
quality of LTC by making it more client-tailored.
The reform consists of four interrelated pillars: a
normative reorientation, a shift from residential to non-
residential care, decentralization of non-residential care
and expenditure cuts [15].
3.1. Normative reorientation
In the government’s view, the broad coverage of LTC and
its high level of public funding had created a supply-driven
and ‘over-medicalized’ system with clients positioned in a
mainly dependent role. Universal access and solidarity in
LTC-ﬁnancing can only be upheld as its normative corner-
stone, if people, where possible, take on more individual
and social responsibility [16,17]. The underlying policy
assumption is that various social care services may  be pro-
vided by family members and local community networks.
This normative reorientation and its underlying
assumption are disputed. An important line of criticism
is not only that informal care is already provided at a
large scale, but also that the potential of ‘unexplored’
informal care is overestimated. Furthermore, the negative
externalities for caregivers who  deliver intense informal
care are underestimated [18]. Interestingly, however, one
can presently observe the emergence of a diverse set of
community initiatives (‘co-operative’ networks) at the
local level to give assistance to persons in their home
setting. Many of these funds use the PGB-arrangement as
an important funding source [19].
3.2. From residential care to non-residential care
The reform aims at a substantial shift of clients from a
residential to a non-residential setting. Residential care will
only remain available to clients for whom non-residential
care is no realistic option. Clients with only mild health
problems are no longer eligible for residential care. The
shift is based upon the assumption that persons with mild
problems may  better be cared for in their home-setting
and that ever more people prefer ‘ageing in place’. In other
words, the shift will make LTC more client-centered.
The reform includes the introduction of a new Long-
term Care Act (Wet  Langdurige Zorg, WLZ) which replaces
the AWBZ. The WLZ, which has come into effect in 2015,
provides a new regulatory framework for residential care.
Just like the former AWBZ, it is set up as a statutory health
insurance scheme. Applicants are subjected to a nation-
ally organized needs assessment procedure according to
uniform and strict standards. Residential care is intended
for clients who  need permanent supervision to avoid esca-
lation or serious damage and clients who need 24 h care
because of physical problems or self-control problems.
Under the new law, clients may  also apply for a personal
budget. A new option is to organize full care at home
[17]. The payroll premium is set at 9.5% of taxable income
beneath 33.600 euros. The transition of the AWBZ into the
WLZ  is in accordance with earlier policy recommendations
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which insurers are responsible.cheme 1. The old and new regulatory framework for LTC (including
ervice package and implementing agency).
o re-focus the AWBZ on long-term care in a residential
etting.
.3. Decentralization of non-residential care
The provision of all non-residential care, formerly cov-
red by the AWBZ, has been devolved to either insurers or
unicipalities (see also Scheme 1). Under the 2006 Health
nsurance Act (Zorgverzekeringswet, ZVW), insurers are now
ade responsible for contracting community nursing (e.g.,
iabetes care, administration of medicines, wound care and
njections) and ‘body-related’ personal care (e.g., support in
ashing, dressing and shaving).
All other non-residential care including, among oth-
rs, services for older persons, persons with a handicap,
ddicts and persons with social psychiatric problems, have
een decentralized to municipalities under the new WMO,
nown as WMO  2015. Municipalities receive a state budget
o carry out their tasks under the new law. The reform has
rastically upgraded the role of local government in LTC
as of 2015 child welfare has also been decentralized to
unicipalities). Upgrading is based on the policy assump-
ion that municipalities are not only best informed about
heir locality, but also best capable to deliver an efﬁcient,
ailor-made and integrated package of services in the social
omain to LTC-clients given their responsibility for various
djacent policy areas including housing, welfare programs,
ransport and local planning [17].
The WMO  2015 gives applicants a right to publicly
unded support if they cannot run a household on their own
nd/or participate in social life. However, it is left to each
unicipality whether they qualify for assistance. Munici-
alities also possess much policy discretion as regards the
ype and extent of assistance to be delivered. For instance,
ach municipality is free to organize non-residential care
nd its need assessment procedure. The procedure may
nclude an assessment of the capability of the applicant’s
ocial network to provide informal care. Municipalities Policy 120 (2016) 241–245 243
may  also introduce their co-payment regime, but means-
testing remains forbidden.
3.4. Expenditure cuts
Initially, it was  the government’s intention to imple-
ment large expenditure-cuts in LTC, but during the
follow-up negotiations (see the section on politics) the
size of these cuts was  gradually scaled back. The expen-
diture cuts in the WMO  and ZVW are 0.7 billion and 0.4
billion euro, respectively. They are politically sold as ‘efﬁ-
ciency cuts’. The government assumes that municipalities
and insurers are able to organize LTC more efﬁciently than
the regional care ofﬁces under the AWBZ. Residential care
is imposed an expenditure cut of 0.5 billion. This cut follows
from the government’s decision to close nursing homes for
clients with only mild problems. Due to these expenditure
cuts the total budget available for LTC drops to 30.6 bil-
lion euro in 2015 which is 5% less than it would have been
without reform.
The expenditure cuts have major consequences for
contracting and tariffs. Especially municipalities negotiate
much lower tariffs. Another strategy is to contract a lower
volume of care. As a consequence many provider organiza-
tions are struggling with deﬁcits which led some of them
to take the radical decision of stopping their activities, par-
ticularly in housekeeping services.
3.5. The politics of LTC reform
Not surprisingly, the reform has been controversial.
Provider and client organizations casted were critical
because of doubts on its feasibility and the validity of
the underlying assumptions. Unions were afraid of mass
lay-offs and worse conditions of employment. The upgrad-
ing of their role in LTC led municipalities to support the
reform, but they casted serious doubts on the feasibil-
ity of the expenditure cuts. During the legislative process
in 2013 and 2014, the government started negotiations
with the national peak organizations of employers and
workers, insurers, municipalities, providers and clients in
order to build a political majority for the reform. These
negotiations resulted in several collective agreements. Also
a political agreement with the three so-called ‘beloved’
opposition parties was  negotiated to achieve a majority in
the Upper Chamber where the coalition government had no
majority of its own. The effect of these negotiations was,
among others, that the total amount of expenditure cuts
was signiﬁcantly scaled back, that some cuts were tem-
porarily postponed, that some measures to restrict access
were attenuated and that various temporary and transi-
tional provisions were made to accommodate a smooth
transition.
An effective lobby of providers and insurers led the gov-
ernment to abstain from its original plan to devolve all
body-related personal care to municipalities. As discussed
earlier, this type of care is now covered under the ZVW forAfter the reform has come into effect (January 2015),
the political game has turned into a politics of imple-
mentation and evaluation. The state secretary for Health
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acknowledged the existence of implementation problems
at the municipal level, but considered these as mainly
transitional [20]. An independent commission installed by
the government concluded, that municipalities were busy
to implement their new tasks thoroughly with a focus on
the continuation of existing care arrangements and that
the number of major incidents had been noticeably low
[21]. In its latest report, the commission underscored the
need for coordination between health and other profes-
sionals in the so-called neighborhood teams to make LTC
really client-centered [22].
At the same time there are signs of the contrary [15]. The
Court of Audit [25] criticized the government for under-
estimating the feasibility of its reforms plan including the
reform of LTC. The media regularly report on municipalities
failing to provide tailor-made services and on mass lay-offs
and worse conditions of employment. Provider organiza-
tions complain on severe tariff cuts. The number of legal
procedures of clients to appeal against a reduction of the
care provided has increased signiﬁcantly [23]. There are
also reports on increasing administrative costs. So far, the
delayed payment of many personal budgets caused the
most political trouble for the state secretary. Some other
concerns are about the capacity of (small) municipalities
to carry out their new tasks properly and the feasibility of
the budgetary cuts. The government is also criticized for
being over-optimistic about the efﬁciency gains of decen-
tralization.
4. Discussion
The 2015 reform is the largest overhaul of LTC since the
AWBZ came into force in 1968. The emphasis on individual
responsibility, the restructuring of the ﬁnancing regime,
the importance of non-residential care, the greater involve-
ment of insurers and municipalities in non-residential care
and the sizable expenditure cuts are its most conspicuous
elements. Access to residential care will only be avail-
able to those who need permanent supervision or 24 h
care. Under the WMO  2015 municipalities are obligated
to give support to clients, but they have large policy dis-
cretion in making this obligation concrete. This may  cause
unequal access to LTC. Given the highly egalitarian cul-
ture in Dutch health care, ‘postcode rationing’ is very much
disputed.
Despite the magnitude of the reform, LTC continues
to be a largely publicly funded provision and a statutory
health insurance scheme will remain in place for per-
sons who need residential care. Furthermore, the beneﬁt
package of LTC continues to be generous compared to most
other European countries.
The Dutch experience with the reform of LTC contains
several policy lessons. The ﬁrst lesson is that implemen-
ting a reform with large ramiﬁcations in only a short period
of time entails many uncertainties and risks for all stake-
holders involved, in particular clients. This is also true for a
reform which seems well-prepared on paper. The govern-
ment had to take many temporary accompanying measures
to lessen these uncertainties and risks. Implementation
appears the ‘Achilles heel’ of the operation.
[
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The second lesson also regards implementation: never
underestimate administrative and ICT-problems. A funda-
mental reform with new regulations and a new ﬁnancing
regime requires the set-up of a new administrative and
ICT-infrastructure, but it always takes time to have such
an infrastructure in place. Unfortunately, it soon turned
out that the administrative and ICT structure did not work
properly. These ‘technical problems’ may rapidly get a
political loading as the State Secretary experienced when
many personal budgets were paid out too late.
The third lesson relates to incentives. The new ﬁnancing
structure for LTC consists of three different regimes (see
Scheme 1), each with its own implementing agencies, reg-
ulations, budgets, clients and so on. Such a structure entails
a great risk of coordination problems because of different
incentives. For instance, municipalities may  have an inter-
est to refer a client to the ZVW-regime or WLZ-regime in
order to save money and vice versa [24]. The success of the
reform will strongly depend on how coordination problems
will be solved and cost-shifting from one regime to another
will be avoided.
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